Shades of Fake Rebellion: Understanding Serbia's Recent Political Unrest w/ Nebojša Malić

Interview with Nebojša Malić

In this episode of "On the Barricades," host Boyan Stanislavski delves into the complexities of Serbian politics and society with guest Nebojša Malić, an American-Serbian journalist and political analyst known for his contributions to @AntiwarcomOriginal and RT America as well as other media outlets. The discussion offers a profound analysis of Serbia's current political climate, focusing on the attempted 'Maidan-like' protests aimed at destabilizing the government, the nuanced position of President Aleksandar Vučić, and the broader implications of external influences on Serbian sovereignty and regional stability.

Key Themes & Timestamps:

*Attempted Color Revolution in Serbia: Malić and Stanislavski argue that the protests against Vučić were a clumsily organized attempt at a 'color revolution,' aimed more at garnering Western support than genuinely overthrowing the government. [Starts around 00:07:00]

* Vučić's Political Strategy: Discussion on Vučić's approach to governance, balancing between appeasing Western demands and maintaining national interests, highlighting his tolerance towards opposition despite potential threats to his administration. [Discussion begins around 00:20:00]

* External Influences & Media Dynamics: The conversation touches on the role of foreign and domestic media in shaping Serbian politics, with Malić critiquing the biased portrayal of events and the influence of Western-backed NGOs and media outlets. [Explored around 00:30:00]

* Cultural and Historical Ties with Russia: The dialogue also explores Serbia's cultural and historical connections with Russia, emphasizing the nuanced relationship between the two countries amidst Western attempts to isolate Serbia from its traditional ally. [Mentioned around 00:40:00]

* Social and Economic Grievances: Malić provides insight into the social and economic challenges facing Serbians, including the impact of economic policies, foreign influences on the housing market, and the general dissatisfaction with the status quo. [Discussed extensively around 00:50:00]

* Future of Serbian Politics: The episode concludes with speculations on the future trajectory of Serbian politics, considering the internal and external pressures facing the country and the potential for change in the political landscape. [Final thoughts around 01:10:00]

We hope that this episode offers an interesting examination of Serbia's current political and social environment, with Nebojša Malić providing detailed insights into the factors shaping the nation's trajectory.

Transcript of the interview

Boyan Stanislavski: Hello and welcome "On the Barricades". My name is Boyan Stanislavski, and I will be your host today. And my guest and your special guest is Nebojša Malić. Welcome to the show, Nebojša, and thanks for taking the time to come on our show.

Nebojša Malić: Thank you for having me, pleasure to be here.

Boyan Stanislavski: Right. So for those out there who might not have encountered any of your work yet, you are an American Serbian journalist and also a political analyst and commentator. You frequently write for the RT website and other media outlets. So thank you once again for coming on, because we do want to delve into the situation in Serbia today and, you know, this kind of post "Non-Maidan" Serbia, maybe, I don't know, what's your take on that? Because, you see, we had this funny events and I say funny, because I feel this was something like a clumsily organized, kind of like Maidan attempt to take down Vučić, in Serbia last year. And, my first question is, do you agree that we're talking here about a clumsily organized, clumsy attempt to stage a Colored revolution in Belgrade?

Nebojša Malić: Well, I think so. Let me just add that, you know, I've spent over a decade covering Balkans affairs, including Serbia for antiwar.com, before I started working for RT America. So, I've got a little bit of experience with local politics here. I'm in Belgrade, but also the original my engagement with antiwar.com started after the original Serbian Maidan or the proto-Maidan that was actually the progenitor of subsequent Color revolutions in Ukraine twice, and then in Georgia and elsewhere, which was in October 2000.

Boyan Stanislavski: Right, the successful Maidan at the time. Right?

Nebojša Malić: Right. And so keeping with the maxim that history repeats itself in the second time as a force, you could look at last year's, sort of, you know, daily evening scheduled riots at the outside of Belgrade City Hall as a farce in this case. There definitely was a very clumsy attempt to take down the government, but I think it was mostly intended to raise the propaganda profile of the organizers in the West and justify their funding. That more than anything else, because I don't think they actually had a hope of overthrowing Vučić.

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm, your thesis is that they knew that they're not going to be able to take down Vučić actually, but they thought that they should test out the ground and see how far they can go and what they can achieve and how the public is going to react. What kind of, attention are they going to be getting from the international media? And, I don't know, some celebrities, political celebrities, if you like. Is my reading correct of what you said?

Nebojša Malić: Yeah, I mean, basically it was one of those if it works, it works. If it doesn't work, it's good PR for us. There is no such thing as bad PR, that's my sense.

Boyan Stanislavski: But, you know, it's a little bit disputable, I would say, because there was a lot of bad PR in the sense that they took, for example, some second hand, sort of recycled, refurbished figures from, you know, the, the dungeons of Twitter, for example, or X as it is called now. And they got like people like Gunther Fehlinger to cheer for this Maidan in Serbia, which is like, I mean, you really could have picked someone else, someone with a little bit more, you know, mental stability, plus a little bit more of an influence, actual influence on the public. And then, you know, when I look in Poland, for example, we have this funny institutes for, investigating eastern affairs, East politics and so on and so forth. And they are really funny because there are no experts there at all. I mean, all those people are ideologically obsessed with, you know, taking down Russia, taking down Serbia, taking down anything that's not dominated by, you know, euro atlanticist tendencies. So and then, you know, we get like one of the funniest and one of the most pathetic people from this Polish, you know, circles to also cheer for this Maidan. And I felt like, you know, looking at the comments, even on X or other platforms where they were posting the comments were profoundly critical and kind of, you know, mocking those people. So that's why I'm saying I don't think the PR was so great, really, when it comes to the...

Nebojša Malić: Right. Well, that's the thing. The PR on social media, especially on X, which is one of, you know, currently the least censored, social network out there were obviously negative. But in the controlled media like this, you know, United Media Network based out of Luxembourg, that dominates, that basically dominates, one half of Serbian media space. It was all very, very serious, very supportive. This, you know, thank you, my friends. You are democracy and justice type of stuff. And this is the audience that they're playing to. And it's, you know, members of European Parliament, it's the Germans, mostly German politicians that they're sucking up to...

Boyan Stanislavski: Pay more, give us more. Right.

Nebojša Malić: Always that's the first and the prime motivation of these people.

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah, same as in Bulgaria, by the way. I mean things on the Balkans. They seem to have been pretty much the same way, only. Okay. So let's, let's talk a little bit now about, Vučić because, that was something that he seems to have anticipated, like him, his government. Ana Brnabić also said that, you know, they were receiving information from Russia or from other intelligence sources abroad that there is this kind of coup or semi-coup being organized. And, clearly they were kind of prepared for it with the police being, you know, placed inside the buildings around which the riots were organized and so on and so forth. But I wonder how tolerant is Vučić and the current, Serbian administration towards this kind of events? Because, you know, the history teaches us that. Right? Especially in the Balkans, like when you look at what's been happening in Belgrade in the year 2000, what's been happening in Sofia and major cities throughout Bulgaria in 1996, 1997. Again, you know, I would argue the first successful Coloured revolution after 1989. So, you know, when you look at it, you see clearly that the more tolerance is demonstrated by the administration, by the central government for this kind of tendencies, the more it is treated as a potential weakness on the part of the government, and the more aggressive those people become, the more aggressive those organizations, those so-called civil society. I hate this phrase, by the way. And, you know, they become aggressive. And I wonder, like, is Vučić prepared to actually at one point maybe, not necessarily kind of repress them massively, but to kind of give them a clear sign that, guys, this is the further furthest sorry, you can go.

Nebojša Malić: Well, my feeling about Vučić's policy is that he's happy to give these people rope to hang themselves with.

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm.

Nebojša Malić: There was a, you know, a couple of years ago, Miloš Biković, the, actor who's famous in both Serbia and Russia and sort of hated in Ukraine now for that reason, he gave an interview to this Russian liberal journalist and she asked him if there's censorship in Serbia. And he said, not enough. And he had a very, very colorful example to illustrate this. But it's been an ongoing problem. And again, this is kind of ironic. You know, I'm in Serbia now and I'm advocating for more censorship. I'm not on principle, I hate censorship, and in some respects, I have to clarify this. I oppose censorship on principle, but Serbia has laws to criminally prosecute people who do things like, you know, spread ethnic or religious hatred.

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm.

Nebojša Malić: And they've been used against, more pro-nationalist, activists over the years. Meanwhile, all of these rabidly pro-EU people are going as far as to wish genocide upon the Serbs and they're on the state payroll, like in universities and in public media. And then when you criticise them, they shriek that they're being victimised and persecuted and, you know, EU help please. Freedom of speech. It's pure cynicism, you know, I mean, if I say something that's objectionable, you know, by all means, please criticize me for it. But these people would like to have their cake and eat it, too. They want to spend their entire day at being paid by the government to defecate all over this country and its people, and advocate for its dismemberment and destruction. And when somebody criticized them, they play the victim. And so, you know, this is one of the problems I would, I would argue is far too tolerant of not just the so-called civil society and NGOs, but of people who openly call for this country's destruction. And yet cracking down on them isn't necessarily practical. And he's basically decided to let them speak and beclown themselves on a daily basis, hoping that, you know, that would demonstrate to the electorate that, you know, they're worthless and terrible and, not worth electing instead of him. And so far, this strategy has worked for him remarkably, he's been in power for 12 years. And, you know, every time these guys make a huge fuss and a huge production, oh, he's done, he's done for, he's going down. We're going to triumph. And they fall flat on their face every time. So from his perspective, this seems to be working from the perspective of the people who have to put up with their crap, pardon my French, day in and day out, it's frankly unbearable.

Boyan Stanislavski: Okay, but tell me a little bit about those groups who call, because I understand it's not just a rhetorical figure here, but there are actually people who are calling for the dismemberment of the Serbian state. Who, yeah...

Nebojša Malić: Absolutely. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, well, you know, there's people, you know, there's folks who, in the middle of Belgrade insist that, you know, Kosovo, for example, is a sovereign, independent state that Serbia needs to recognize, which is literally treason.

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah.

Nebojša Malić: You know...

Boyan Stanislavski: Sure.

Nebojša Malić: It's against the Serbian constitution, etc., etc.. But I mean, this position should be at the very least controversial. But, you know, these people keep arguing it. You have people advocating for, you know, separating this northern province called Vojvodina, which is a relic of communism, and it doesn't need to exist at all, in my opinion and opinion of many others. But, you know, once you have a bureaucracy, it's self-sustaining and self-perpetuating. And so it's carrying on and again, at government expense, people's expense. And there are people who literally want it to separate and have been arguing. Now, admittedly, they're polling in single digits, but they have a disproportionately loud voice because they have media access.

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah and they have financing and, you know, support of the EU and so on, right?

Nebojša Malić: Exactly. And so they use this financing and external support to sow discord and advocate for literally dismemberment of their country, which again, is, as far as I understand, Serbian law, it's a criminal offence, but they don't get prosecuted or so much as hassled.

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm. Okay. And why is that? Because Vučić has this clever strategy, or because Vučić is afraid that they're going to come at him if he actually attempts to restrain those tendencies.

Nebojša Malić: I mean, it's possible that it's a little from column A, a little from column B, he doesn't want to necessarily annoy the EU and the West too much because he's doing this delicate balancing act. The one phrase that he used that it's better to be at the table than, you know, on the table as in being served.

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah, I get that. But I'm kind of doubtful about the strategy. And of course, you know, I'm not I'm not an expert in Serbian politics or Serbian internal matters or Serbian, you know, the processes that take place in Serbia right now. But it just very kind of worrisome when you see a leader that's facing an obvious attempt to, you know, organize against, well, against him, against his government and against, like democratically like the government after all. Right. And, someone who does have support of the people and so on and so forth. And that's been demonstrated in election after election after election for the last 12 years, as you said, including the early elections last year. So, you know, we're talking about a kind of strategy, which is, of course, I mean, you can argue in favor of that strategy, but it's always very worrisome when you give them, you know, when you give them enough room because they will always use every millimetre of it to undermine your position. And in the final aftermath, you know, when they have a chance, they'll just stick, you know, a fork into your forehead or your back or something.

Nebojša Malić: Well, I mean, you know, as the Americans say, give them an inch and they'll take a mile. I mean, yeah. And I've been on the record criticizing Vučić for this strategy because I think it's, sort of alien to the Serbian national character, this sort of compromising, you know, wishy washing. You know, we are small and we must submit type thing that's really just alien to our national character. And I've repeatedly said this. But again, it seems to be working for him, and he seems to be, you know, determined to maintain it.

Boyan Stanislavski: Right, so maybe he knows better, like. Right.

Nebojša Malić: He's in politics. I'm not. So, you know, his mileage may vary, but, by the same token, you know, if I were in his place, which I'm not, I would probably use at least a little bit of lawfare against people who are who think they can get away with everything just to send them a message that they "no" they can't.

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah. But also, how is the Serbian public reacting to this, to these notions that are offered from what you, you know, just described to separate Vojvodina from proper Serbia and to recognize Kosovo and so on and so forth. Because in Bulgaria, to make a comparison between the two neighboring countries, which are different, but still, I mean, there are elements and spheres where we can make comparisons. Then when it comes to this crowd of people who just, you know, blindly follow the West and think like Bulgaria and Serbia, and everybody has to be like the West, because deep down inside, like everybody in Serbia and in Bulgaria and in Greece is like they want to be like the Americans, like the Germans or like the French. So we have a small crowd of people like that and they don't necessarily call for, you know, splitting up Bulgaria or anything like that. But they what they practice is this kind of active self-hatred of their own culture, nation and everything, which is pathetic, you know, I've never been like, politically speaking, never positioned myself in the kind of patriotic circles or things like that. I've always been on the kind of socialistic side. But the thing is that, you know, now when I'm looking at it, I just become patriot myself because I just want to defend the Bulgarian nation against it. I mean, what are you how can you just, you know, speak to people like this, that they are worthless, that they are, you know, they are only worth to be loathed and, you know, despised and so on and so forth, because they, I don't know, because they don't accept certain elements of the dominating ideologies in the West. So we have this, and this is a very, very small group, and it doesn't have any support in the society. But because the West, you know, the collective West, as the Russians like to refer to it now, has put all their eggs in that particular basket. In Bulgaria they keep prevailing. And I wonder whether, you know, people in Serbia or yourself, maybe as a political analyst can see that happening in Serbia as well. Like, you know, you will have a small group, no basis in society, but because of the Western support, they are able to somehow prevail. And, you know, Serbia has somehow managed to defend itself. Right? I mean, after the 2000 and the successful Maidan at that time, they were able to get to a point where Vučić is who he is and he's leading the country kind of balancing between Russia and the EU. But, you know, that's undoubtedly the plan, the Western plan for Serbia this to become. Do you think that, you know, with this politics, with this administration of Vučić, do you think that, you know, this model, Vučić's model is sustainable? And do you see that it can it can develop and maybe mobilize people against these kind of trends?

Nebojša Malić: Well, I don't know whether it was Vučić who mobilized people against this kind of sentiment, but it was literally these people's agitation campaign. You know, in the media, every time one of them goes on, one of these pro-Western networks or, you know, in one of these pro-Western newspapers with the tiny circulation that seemed to be given relevance by their they have this sort of circular reporting ring of where one outlets quotes the other, which quotes the other, and they sort of, you know, let me just keep it there so I remain polite. There's other expressions I could use, but they seem to be relevant in that, you know, to themselves. But every time they do this, the general public reacts with revulsion. And the more they spit on Serbia, the more patriotic the people here get. And so it's but it's that might be one of the reasons why Vučić is letting them do this. Because again, he has legal avenues to stop this, but he's choosing not to use them because, again, from his perspective, they're actually fueling patriotic resistance. The more they talk, the more patriotic, especially the younger generations get. Now, going back a few years, for the first 12 years of the century, Serbia was actually ruled by the most fanatical, let's call them Liberal Democrats, because that's what they call themselves, who literally carried out the EU's every whim and the US's every whim, violating the Constitution left and right, you know, destroying Yugoslavia, which was then still a country, you know, practically handing over Kosovo, like, never forget that, the ethnic Albanians waited to declare their independence after the Serbian presidential election because the Democrat was, sort of arranged to win it at the time. I mean, this was this is all related. And then in 2012, they sort of fell flat on their face, when Vučić was present, had sort of politically reinvented himself. But, he... The Serbian political scene has realigned since then because Vučić is now claiming to be this liberal progressive whatever. And, you know, you've got these outwardly patriotic parties that are for, you know, dropping the EU all together, disavowing NATO altogether, you know, entering some sort of union alliance with Russia overtly. And they're generally getting terrible results in elections because, you know, Vučić has just sort of suck the air out of the room. Things are polarized between him and these, you know, fringe, Euro Liberal, you know, grant eaters. And again, you know, the Grant eaters are sort of doing his job for him by galvanizing the public into saying, well, you know, we got to vote for whoever is not these guys. Now, I don't think they're the controlled opposition, but they certainly play the part, and they earnestly want to get into power. It's just that their mindset is so twisted from being in their own media echo chamber that they cannot conceive how to reach out to the electorate. And moreover, they hate the electorate.

Boyan Stanislavski: Exactly, yes.

Nebojša Malić: They despise the electorate, they disdain the people that they want to rule over. And they...

Boyan Stanislavski: They want someone to hand them dictatorial power over this crowd that they hate.

Nebojša Malić: Right, right. They want EU, you know, they want the Germans to come in and set them up in power and, you know, back them up with troops just like they did back in 1941, I guess. Right. Right. And it's one of those sentiments... And then they wonder why they can't get enough votes. I mean, from my perspective, they're getting too many already.

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Well can we speak a little bit, but very briefly about those leading figures of this kind of opposition, I mean, opposition to Vučić, opposition to the nationalistic/patriotic, forces that you mentioned here, this opposition that is financed by the EU and that is behind the events, at the end of the last year and other events, of course. Can you tell me a few words literally about the leading figures and if they have any achievements that they can base themselves on? Because, you know, in Bulgaria, for example, again, let's use this country as a point of comparison, because, you know, those leaders of the "civil society", you know, leaders of this, opposition groups that well, now they're in power really, so they're not opposition anymore. But, you know, those pro-Western, obsessively pro-Western people, then they don't really have any leaders that can come up with any sort of achievements that we've achieved this in politics, or we've achieved that in academia or we've achieved this in whatever other field. But they are, you know, bloggers or they are anti-corruption activists, whatever it means, you know, this kind of people who have most of them have not worked seriously one day in their life. And they are just now this, flourishing leadership of this, of this sort of pro-Western opposition in Serbia and people in power in Bulgaria. So I wonder whether you could just give us a brief overview of the, say, two, three, maybe most important figures in that movement, quote unquote.

Nebojša Malić: Well, the most prominent figure on sort of the, you know, the pro-EU, side is actually an oligarch and pocket the difference. And he was making millions off of that. And of course, when, you know, he was no longer in power, suddenly that racket collapsed. Wonder why? And he's been in charge of the most prominent, the biggest party in this bloc. And you have, these, you know, younger people that style themselves, you know, eco activists, when it's popular...

Boyan Stanislavski: Can you throw in the name? Can you throw in the...

Nebojša Malić: I'd rather not discuss names.

Boyan Stanislavski: Okay, okay.

Nebojša Malić: Because great minds discuss ideas and petty minds discuss people. But, you know, people will recognize themselves.

Boyan Stanislavski: All right.

Nebojša Malić: But, you know, you've got these younger people who are, like, eco activists when it's popular. And then when that idea has been expanded, they turn to something else. They turn to like LGBTQ IP rights and so on and so forth. They basically embrace any pet cause that gives them PR there are, you know, in one of the prominent, activists that was hawked during these pseudo-Maidan protests, in December, turned out to be like the son of prominent NGO activists. It's like, you know, the joke in America that you've had like fifth generation welfare recipients. Well, in Serbia at this point, you have third generation NGO activists.

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm.

Nebojša Malić: It's like a hereditary industry now.

Boyan Stanislavski: It's almost like a family business. Democracy is a family business. Right.

Nebojša Malić: Exactly. And if you remember that infamous documentary about revolution as a business from like 2011, you realize how ghastly this is because these people are mercenaries. They don't actually believe in any of this stuff. They use their powers of persuasion for frankly evil.

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm.

Nebojša Malić: And so, you know, and again the pattern is the same. They make these public pronouncements, they pander to a media audience, not to the electorate, because they hate the electorate. And then they condemn the people for being, you know, stupid backwards, toothless peasants who hate democracy and don't deserve to live like every normal person does, which is this mythical concoction created in the 90s. Like, let's face it, people who are trying to sell the EU and the US as a model of prosperity now in the year 2024 are idiots.

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah, that's ludicrous on its face. I mean like...

Nebojša Malić: 20 years ago, I would understand like I would understand. I've lived in the US for very many years. I would understand, you know, if circa 2003, 2004, before the Iraq invasion, prosperity was still a thing, I would get it, but now. That, you know, you have documentary evidence, irrefutable evidence of your own eyes and ears, that things are bad both in the US and in Western Europe. But I'm sorry, but you you're either a mercenary, you're out of your freaking mind.

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah... or you are ideologically obsessed. And I'm sorry I go back to this notion because it's really, it becomes like a medical condition these days. I mean, when you look, when you talk to people in many Eastern European countries, you will still see this blind kind of, you know, blind following of it's not even blind following of the West anymore, but blind following of the imagination that you once had about how things are in the West and you just don't want to let go because you're afraid so much on a kind of psychological level that the world is going to crumble before you if you just give up this, this idea.

Nebojša Malić: Right. Well, I've called this cargo cult democracy, basically, there was this back in World War II, when the US troops were deployed in, today's Papua New Guinea fighting the Japanese. They had these airfields where, you know, airplanes would bring in, crates of supplies and the locals who were technologically disadvantaged, shall we call them? Decided that the planes are messengers of the gods, that they magically deliver cargo to the true believers, and the cargo is wealth and power and guns and so forth. And so they built fake airfields out of like sticks and, you know, whatever local materials were available. And they would light beacons and, you know, call down cargo. And the American observers called these the cargo cults of New Guinea.

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm.

Nebojša Malić: These were people who saw something, explained it through primitive religion and addressed it accordingly. And I'm not insulting Eastern Europeans...Yes, we must launch a holy crusade against Russia. And, you know, that's, you know, resurrect the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and, you know, go back to the 17th century and it's like, what are you people even doing?

Boyan Stanislavski: Right, right... That's a question I'm asking myself as well. But this is yet, you know, a whole other show where we can discuss, like, the meanders of the Polish elites thinking about the world and perceiving itself, in this world and in its region, it's like, you know, you have to follow them galaxy after galaxy, because it's a very convoluted process. So I will not delve into that right now because it would take another half an hour, 45 minutes, and we don't have that much time. But let's go back for a while to because we discussed briefly the figures of the opposition against Vučić and this kind of Pro-Maidan, you know, obsessively pro-EU opposition, you know, that is part, a minor part of the political process, but still an important part, despite, being limited in terms of quantity and its impact on the political process in Serbia, it's still a part of it. But let's talk a little bit about Vučić, because people are very confused about this guy. And can you give us a brief sort of history because you said it yourself? He kind of transitioned at one point. So who is Vučić and is he real? Because, you know, there is this discussion, of course, in social media. Is he really, you know, for this kind of brotherhood with Russia or is he actually a sellout that is going to, you know, hand over at one point, but later on in time, Serbia on a silver plate to the EU and the West. or is he something in terms of a political phenomenon? I didn't mean to ridicule him. Is he someone that is not that we're not able to describe in this one, you know, in this primitive or very simple categories that he's on this side or that side, is he maybe a seasoned politician that he that is maneuvering very cleverly? What is your take and what is his history? Briefly, if you could.

Nebojša Malić: Oh, well, his history isn't very informative of who he is now. Interestingly enough, he was a, he rose through the ranks of the Radical Party in the 90s, he was a considered a political apprentice of Vojislav Šešelj, who was a sort of a very boorish Zhirinovsky type. And it's insulting Zhirinovsky because he's actually far more intelligent than people give him credit for. But sort of a, you know, outspoken, loudmouth nationalist figure, who was playing sort of the radical bad cop foil to Slobodan Milošević.

Boyan Stanislavski: But you're talking about Šešelj now?

Nebojša Malić: Yeah, I'm talking about Šešelj, yeah. And Vučić sort of rose through the ranks as a junior member of that party, ending up being as a deputy to Šešelj's successor, Tomislav Nikolić. And then Nikolić... So both of them sort of left the Radical Party in like 2010, 2011. I'm a little fuzzy on the exact year and initially sort of, form this fraction and then read rebranded themselves as the Progressive Party, which, as some Serbian historians pointed out, was actually the radical sworn enemy back in the 1800s.

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm.

Nebojša Malić: The choice of the of the party may have been accidental or may have been a really, really deep cut because during the last years of the Obrenović dynasty, which was Pro-Austrian, the Progressive Party was sort of their pet party in the parliament. The sort of a bit of a show. And the radicals were the sort of a populist, Pro- Karageorgevich faction. And the radicals eventually triumphed, and the Progressivists were famously chased down the streets of Belgrade and beaten with sticks used to clean the outhouses at the time in an infamous episode. And so the proverbial shit stick is, a kind of a Serb folk weapon for political disputes.

Nebojša Malić: But, I know it's a meme...

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah.

Nebojša Malić: But, you know, so to name your party progressive with knowing that history seems like a hint, and yet it seems like it was actually conjured together by a British PR shop that helped create the party back in 2011. And that shop then went out of business because of a scandal in South Africa. So it's questionable whether they're still in control. I would argue they're not anymore. But, he sort of positioned himself as, okay, well, you know, clean slate. None of this past history, you know, none of this past matters, you know, turning over a new leaf and the party kicks him out. And he's forced to resign. And then he claims that, you know, he's going to run a rival movement that's going to win layoffs, sweep the election, and he wins like less than 1% of the vote and is kicked to the curb. But you know, this type of I own the mandate system encourages this kind of fractious behavior. And I'm convinced at this point it was done on purpose.

Boyan Stanislavski: Right, right. Well, okay. That's pretty fascinating. Everything, you know, you explained here and, about Serbian politics and about, you know, the recent events. I wonder if we could, you know, circle back for a little while to the question of this Maidan thing that occurred, you know, Maidan-like, you know, Maidan wannabe, maybe, event of the last year. I want you to briefly speak about the actual grievances of the Serbian society today, because you described the political scene, that there's so much pettiness that there's so much like emotional hype, maybe on individual level, personal kind of personalization of politics and so on and so forth. This is a problem that not only Serbia suffers from, of course. But it seems like those problems are more prominent maybe in your country. But then, you know, I'm sure that, you know, when they get to the point where they want to organize something like a Colored revolution, then they always base part of the idea on the actual real grievances that the society has. And they are trying to, of course, manipulate, you know, large masses of people into this movement. And, and then eventually, if many people are in fact involved, then eventually this process could be successful. And we've seen that, by the way, you know, many, many times over, we've seen how it played out in Belarus in 2020, if I remember correctly. So, that was essential right the moment. You know, you probably remember that when they were trying to activate the labor unions, right? I mean, they wanted the labor unions to join and labor unions refused. That was, I think, a pivotal moment for Lukashenko and for the armed forces, for the, you know, for, well, not only the armed forces, but the police and the repression operators, so to say not to give up, you know, loyalty to Lukashenko and so on and so forth. I don't want to delve into that. I just brought it up as a kind of reference point. But there were real grievances. I mean, real grievances in terms of like, economic hardship and other matters, of course, in the Belarusian society. So I'm thinking that it must have been the same or partially at least the same, in the case of Serbia in December 2023. So I wonder if you could speak about, you know, the actual grievances, the actual social problems. And of course, I understand you're not going to be able to go deep into each and every of them. But like, you know, in a kind of superficial, compact manner, if you could just say, what are the biggest problems, in your opinion, in your view in terms of, how people in Serbia, you know, live, survive, maybe, develop, what are their perspectives, how things are and what could prompt people out of the problems that they are probably or perhaps facing could prompt them to actually join this kind of protest movement?

Nebojša Malić: Well the pseudo "Maidanites" in December that tried to storm the Belgrade City Hall, didn't actually harp on social issues at all. They went with the election was stolen narrative, that seemed cribbed from the US. I know, but in the case of Belarus. Sorry to interrupt you, but in the case of Belarus, it was the same. They also said, oh, the elections were stolen and... Okay, but, what is igniting people to sometimes join that is some kind of grievances that they have, right? Yeah.

Nebojša Malić: Well, one of the reasons that their particular argument fizzled was that they claimed the elections were stolen nationwide, but they only wanted it revised in Belgrade, because that's where they had a theoretical chance of getting power and access to funding. It's, it's access to tax money, that's the key because political parties in the Balkans in general subside on, state patronage. So you need, you know, control of utility companies, which are extractive in nature as opposed to serving the populace. You need control of budgets. You know, you basically the whole method of financing is from the state, you know, from state grants. And so whoever gets to control the government gets to control the fisc and extract from it. And, you know, this is why Belgrade has been an obsession of everybody, really, but specifically in this instance, the pro-EU organization, that wanted to seize power in the city because it is the biggest city in Serbia. That's where all the money is. Especially in recent years, because, there is a real grievance. There's a real social grievance, by Serbians, because their cost of living has gone up, partly because of Covid, partly because of the economic crisis in the EU, partly because they've agreed the government has agreed to jack up the prices of utilities such as, you know, power, specifically electricity at because the IMF and the EU demand it. Well, why should we care? But okay, and so, you know, every society's prosperity rests on cheap energy. And, you know, some people complain that their bills have doubled. That's a lot. Salaries haven't gone up. You know, I've been going around Belgrade for weeks looking at storefronts, advertising, you know, help wanted offering salaries and benefits. And nobody wants to work because the amount that they're willing to pay people is not enough to cover the ever rising expenses. And it's just one of those baffling examples of how distorted the economies have become from the lockdowns in Serbia, said pretty mild ones. But they still, you know, during I believe right after Covid, there was this whole thing of, you know, oh, there's some kind of cattle plague or swine plague. We must kill all the pigs. And Serbia decimated its pig farming industry and as a result, the prices of meat have gone up.

Boyan Stanislavski: Sure.

Nebojša Malić: And so you've got prices of food going up. You've got, you know, and a lot of it is being imported from the EU because the meat production and processing has sort of been wildly privatized and sold off to Westerners. And again, like Serbia is a big agricultural country. It has magnificent food production. But a lot of the stuff you see on the shelves is, you know, literally yesterday I got a thing of kefir that was, you know, Russian branded, but in Romanian. And it turns out it's produced by Germans, exported to Moldova and then sent back to Serbia by a third party. Lord knows how much they're making in arbitrage. You know, this is the kind of thing that you've got shelves full, but at what cost? And what is that doing to domestic manufacturers, that sort of thing? I don't want to get into the detail, you know, pedestrian details of economics to bored people to tears. But these are important things. And the biggest problem that people here complain that I've heard people voice is that, you know, the salaries are not enough to live on because everything has gotten much more expensive. And one of the big factors in this is the arrival of all of these foreigners, specifically Russians and Ukrainians,

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm.

Nebojša Malić: Both, you know, dissidents or refugees from the war, because there's a lot of Ukrainians who fled mobilization, and there's a lot of Russians who disagreed with the government and fled here, also fearing they would be drafted. And then there's people who came voluntarily so they could continue working in the IT sector and sort of, you know, not be targeted by Western sanctions. Well, for whichever reason they showed up, you know, they were able to bring in a lot some of them were able to bring in a lot of money with them. And whenever that happens, it just distorts the market significantly. And they're sort of pricing the locals out. Yesterday I was reading a comparison of rents in Europe and in Balkans capitals. And they were saying that Sarajevo, which is in Bosnia, is far cheaper because the city has, you know, basically come to rely on tourism. A lot of the locals have sold off properties, and so a lot of them are unrented and just sitting abandoned, and they're willing to drop the rents in order to cover them. Again, not to get into details, but like Belgrade is full. There's a lot of real estate. The real estate balloon has been really inflated over the last couple of years and people can't afford rent. Unless, you know, unless they've been grandfathered in. If you're actually just moving to Belgrade, you can't afford it.

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm. Mhm..

Nebojša Malić: And so again like these are the things that, you know, things that the markets are expensive relative to the, to the local income. You got, you got to calculate by purchasing power parity, you can't just say oh well this is cheaper than in Berlin...

Boyan Stanislavski: Sure

Nebojša Malić: ...or more expensive in Washington to, you know, not to, not to rag on Tucker Carlson going into Russian supermarket. But, you know, I think his point was that, you know, it's clean and people return to shopping carts and nothing's locked up because of thieves, which all of which are true. And nothing is locked up in Belgrade either.

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah, or in Warsaw, for that matter, or, you know, in Sofia. Yeah, so, yeah...

Nebojša Malić: But that's normal. That's expected, you know, you can't expect people in Serbia to be grateful that, you know, their supermarkets don't lock up toothbrushes.

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm. Mhm.

Nebojša Malić: You know, that's normal. You shouldn't have to. So you can't say well you know, but there are cities in America that are, you know, collapsing into savagery. Well okay. But what's it to me. Mhm. You know I need to pay my bills at the end of this month.

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah, of course, of course.

Nebojša Malić: And that's a legitimate grievance of a lot of people. The problem is that the opposition... Neither the opposition nor I mean the government is like, well, the solution is to dig up half of Serbia for lithium and sell it to the EU. No, actually it isn't. But, you know, and the opposition is like, we need to sell twice as much lithium to the EU and also give up Kosovo and, you know, give us power to reprogram the toothless peasants that are terrible and that don't deserve our benevolent rule. And I'm like, you people are idiots. And thank God that you're idiots because you'll never get in power this way. And, you know, nobody really seems to care about, you know, the ordinary people and what's on the shelves.

Boyan Stanislavski: Sure.

Nebojša Malić: Whether through government subsidies or debt or whatever. But he actually, you know, he spoke about these issues that people care about that directly affect their daily lives.

Boyan Stanislavski: And are probably more important than the historical kind of, you know, ideas that you might have on the basis of all kinds of things that you mentioned are also very often floated in politics as some kind of viable reference point. So, yeah, look for the end, because we got to wrap it up here. We've spoken for over one hour, which, you know, I want to thank you again for taking the time to explain all those things in detail. That's a fascinating journey into the political reality in Serbia today. I want to talk a little bit about the question of, you know, the attitude and relations between Russia and Serbia because, you know, there's a lot of talk and especially in Poland, when you turn on the mainstream media, which I don't do often out of hygiene, but when you turn them on, then you will hear, you know, if the question of Serbia comes up, then it's always, oh, my God, it's Russian colonized. The Russians are everywhere. They're they control everyone. They pull the strings and all the rest of it, you know? And, of course I understand. And most of our viewers, I'm sure, are aware that it's not the case. But on the other hand, we have to ask ourselves the following question. You know, there is this, I call it I like to call it the Orthodox bow. When you look Eastern Europe, you know, then, of course, there's Russia, then there's Belarus, Ukraine. Until some time ago, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, you know, maybe Montenegro, I don't know, maybe some other Post-Yugoslav republics and Greece even to a certain extent, where you can see that there is a favorable brotherly attitude among the public, not among the political classes, but among the public towards Russia. And, you know, of course, this is being despised like in many, you know, in Western countries and also in other countries as well, by these marginal people, who hate the history and the kind of culture that we've developed in these, in these regions. So, you know, we have this and I wonder whether, you know, you you feel that Russia is even thinking of exploiting it in any way because, you know, my observation is exploiting it in terms of like, you know, geo-political leverage or some kind of political strategies. And please don't get me wrong, I'm not calling for Russia to colonize those countries. I'm just thinking, because, you know, I don't see that. I mean, I don't see I've heard about this Russian influence in Serbia, Russian influence in Bulgaria. Everything is controlled by Russians there. And somehow, you know, I consider myself to be a rather careful observer of what things are like and have been like in Bulgaria for the last decades. And I've really seen so little Russian influence, so little that it barely, you know, it's barely visible in terms of, you know, Russia's political investment into the political process in Bulgaria or, you know, in other countries.

Boyan Stanislavski: And I wonder whether you see that the same way, first of all. And second, whether you feel that there is any kind of Russian influence in Serbia, for example, and whether it is wisely managed from the point of view of Russian interests, whatever they might be, or however you might want to define them in Serbia, because, you know, again, I was looking deliberately for it in many areas in Eastern Europe. And of course, Belarus is a separate story, obviously. and Ukraine today is a separate story as well. But, you know, when it comes to, well, the Balkans, our area, right when obviously the Bulgarian nation, the Serbian nation, other nations probably as well. But those two especially, they obviously clearly demonstrate they stand with Russia, however they understand it or not understand sometimes. But, you know, Russia doesn't seem to be really much interested in taking any kind of advantage from Russia's attitude. Seems to me to be like, look, guys, if you work it out, the way that you want to work with us afterwards and you want to align with us somehow, that's your business. If you don't do that or if you don't have enough strength to do that, if you allow the West to dominate you, it's your problem. We don't care anymore. This is how I see it. What's what's your take?

Nebojša Malić: I think you're spot on. Actually, this is probably the perfect summary of Russian policy. I don't have it. I don't have any, like, direct sources of information on Russian policy. This is only speculation based on, you know, the effects of it, but I...

Boyan Stanislavski: You can see what is available in the public...

Nebojša Malić: Right. What is strictly observable is that Moscow does not do soft power the way Washington does. One of the things the US has been really good at for decades is propaganda. And not just any propaganda, but the kind of, you know, seductive conserist, you know, showing people the American Dream type of thing. That has had a side effect in recent years of drawing millions of migrants from all over the world across the US-Mexico border. Even though America isn't like that and hasn't been for quite some time. But you know, they keep selling the dream to people through these, you know, through ads, through TV shows, through movies. Whereas Russians don't necessarily do that. Their movies, especially the state subsidized ones, do have political and cultural messages, but they seem mostly targeting the home audience and not necessarily international audiences. I think the farthest they've gone in sort of any sort of cultural outreach to Serbia has been the Balkan line, the movie about the 99 Kosovo war from a few years back, which was great, don't get me wrong. But like that was the extent of that. The Russian influence in Serbia is mostly cultural in so, you know, there's concerts, there's, you know...

Boyan Stanislavski: Oh, you're lucky you still have that... In Poland, for example, it has been erased.

Nebojša Malić: Right, right. I mean, yeah, in the West has been has been cancelled. But, you know, and you have ironically, because of all of these migrants, you have some culinary influences and you know, you get, you know, you can find kvass in stores now, which you weren't able to until a few years back, you know, some Russian foods and specialties. And, you know, there was a Georgian restaurant that I just saw the other day in Belgrade, which was highly unusual. But again, there's no like... Moscow doesn't have a policy of influence that I can see. Yeah. Unlike Washington, unlike Brussels now, their attempts at cultural hegemony are often ham fisted and counterproductive. But the Russian one seems nonexistent.

Boyan Stanislavski: Mhm.

Nebojša Malić: And so I basically I would go so far as to argue that most Russian influence in the Balkans, in Serbia specifically, is a phantom menace conjured by these, you know, Western grant eaters who need an enemy...

Boyan Stanislavski: Exactly!

Nebojša Malić: ...and who have to and who have to invent this, You know,

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah, they're making it up all the way.

Nebojša Malić: Yeah, yeah. In order to justify, oh, you know, give me more money Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or Soros or whatever. And, you know, it's...

Boyan Stanislavski: And it's also... I think it's also this element that they just cannot quite comprehend that people might think differently than in France or America, you know, I mean, because they think like in France and America.

Nebojša Malić: Right? And it's also projection because, you know, because they're the cultists who worship the West due to Western influence. Therefore there must be, you know, everybody who...

Boyan Stanislavski: Something nefarious about the other person. Yeah. So it's Russian influence, probably because otherwise...

Nebojša Malić: Right, therefore anybody who likes Moscow has to be, you know, has to be propagandized. It's, it's confession through projection.

Boyan Stanislavski: Yeah. Exactly. Exactly. You know, very well said. Absolutely, absolutely. Okay, Nebojša, on that note, I want to wrap up, today's video. Thank you very much. It was really very interesting. And I hope to see you again on our program. I would like I would love to discuss, especially that you revealed while we were talking here that you are a historian. So I want to use this, as a kind of advantage to perhaps discuss a little bit the history of pulling Yugoslavia apart, because that's also a very kind of mythologized thing in the European historiography. And it again is... This sort of idea that people who live in Eastern Europe or somehow, you know, not humanistic, not human enough, not politically wise enough to organize their own countries and their own nations and their own cultures. And they always have to, you know, fight together and so on and so forth. And I'd love to discuss this, and I'd love to discuss 1999, of course, and the lead up to 1999. This is also something completely falsified in the mainstream. And that's something that we'd love to have you on to sort of discuss if and when you happen to have a little bit of time to share with us and, to our viewers and listeners, I want to encourage you to please check out our Substack account where you can get regular newsletters. So don't miss out on anything. It's thebarricade.substack.com, and also you can visit our telegram channel. It's very easy to find, you just type in the barricade in the search engine, so to say, in telegram. And you can find it. And also last, but not least, please visit our Patreon account Patreon.com/thebarricade where you can support us financially if you like our productions. Thank you very much, Nebojša, and thank you very much to all the people watching and listening to our show. See you in the next segments.