Why are the EP elections so weirdly diverted? Well, now we know
As the European Parliament elections approach, many are puzzled by the strangely predominant focus on Russia rather than EU-centric issues.
As the European Parliament elections draw near, those residing in the EU and with a vested interest in public affairs may find themselves utterly perplexed. Throughout this campaign, you might have frequently pondered why the discourse is predominantly focused on Russia rather than European or European Union issues. This seems particularly illogical given that these elections are meant to address matters pertinent to the European Parliament.
In reality, the situation is even more troubling. An examination of the political and media landscape surrounding the upcoming European elections in most Eastern European countries reveals that the discourse overwhelmingly centers on Russia. This focus prompts a critical question: why is this the case? Why are we not equally engaged in discussions about profoundly European issues such as the Green New Deal, the Fit for 55 package, or the Migration Pact, which narrowly passed through the European Parliament just a few weeks ago?
The Migration Pact and the elections stakes
Examining the manner in which the Migration Pact was adopted might provide some insight into the broader questions, particularly regarding the focus of the election campaign discourse. This closer look could reveal underlying reasons for why the narrative has been shaped the way it has, especially considering the spins that have dominated the discussion.
Regardless of whether you support or oppose the measures contained in the Migration Pact, an honest assessment of the proceedings reveals that, until the last minute, it was uncertain whether this highly contentious act would pass in the European Parliament. This uncertainty was compounded by significant opposition from several member countries. Notably, the American publication Politico — widely regarded as a key platform where East Coast Americans convey their perspectives to high-ranking European bureaucrats — reported on the morning of the vote that French President Emmanuel Macron had called Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, nearly imploring him to persuade his MEPs to abstain rather than vote against the pact.
This intervention failed, as all of Donald Tusk's Members of the European Parliament voted against the pact, aligning with the EU-long-and-harshly-criticized Law and Justice MEPs. The tension surrounding the vote on the Migration Pact underscores the high stakes of the upcoming European Parliament elections, scheduled from June 7 to 9.
Rising panic among EU elites and the ECFR report
The EU elite is acutely aware that there is a significant chance of losing its current dominance.
Polls consistently indicate that the European People's Party (EPP), historically the largest political group in the European Parliament, could lose its leading position if the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) merge with the Identity and Democracy (ID) group. A combined ECR and ID group could secure between 160 and 180 MEPs. The EPP is vying for a similar number of seats, although the exact figures vary across different polls. While the EPP would still hold a majority in combination with the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), together controlling between 310 and 330 seats, this would not constitute an independent majority. Subsequent votes would require additional support from smaller groups, including the Greens, the Left, and Renew Europe. Therefore, nothing would be guaranteed, and without the EPP's approval, passing European legislation would be highly challenging.
Judging by the reactions of European leaders such as Ursula von der Leyen or Frans Timmermans, it is evident that a sense of panic is developing among the EU's mainstream elites.
This growing anxiety is further evidenced by a report from the Euro-hyper-enthusiastic think tank, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), titled A New Political Map: Getting the European Parliament Election Right.
The report, released on March 21st, reflects — in an astoundingly telling manner — the establishment's sudden realization of their precarious situation and is pretty much a manifestation of their fears.
The authors of this report include two prominent analysts, one of whom is Ivan Krastev (Иван Кръстев), arguably one of the most notorious figures in post-1989 Bulgarian history. Krastev is a fanatical advocate of capitalist liberal democracy and Euro-Atlanticism as well as unhinged anti-communist, and has been a prominent supporter of these ideologies across various organizations and political processes in Eastern Europe.
The other author is Mark Leonard, who currently serves as the president/director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Leonard posits that the threat to mainstream groups' positions in the upcoming June elections is substantial, noting that their representatives are poorly approaching the campaign's onset. Instead of effectively garnering support, they are inadvertently bolstering the opposition. The report characterizes the opposition as “far-right” and “Euroskeptic.”
The authors based their rather weak and clearly ideologically (therapeutically?) bended analysis on surveys conducted in 12 EU countries: Poland, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Germany, Hungary, France, Spain, Portugal, Romania, Greece, and Italy. In the context of these polls and the report, "far-right and Eurosceptic forces" in Poland refer to the Law and Justice party, while "mainstream forces" pertain to the Civic Coalition, the party led by Donald Tusk.
It’s worth noting that from the outset it becomes evident that the report's understanding is founded on flawed premises (clearly stemming out from the most recent ideological obsessions with Kaczyński, Orbán and Fico), as it categorizes the Law and Justice party (PiS) as “far-right” and “Euroskeptic” without any substantial justification based on their actions or declarations. It is absolutely obvious that it’s all driven much more by the EU elite's increasing anxiety which has recently metastasized into complete intolerance for any dissent (although it’s mostly a conservative backlash) with regards to the war, sanctions and most notably the socio-cultural agenda, rather than objective analysis.
As for Poland: Donald Tusk's Civic Coalition is fully compliant with EU directives, whereas Jaroslaw Kaczyński's PiS has maintained a geopolitical loyalty more aligned with Washington and NATO than with Brussels. Despite any personal or political reservations Kaczyński might have about the EU, he has consistently supported Poland's membership and complied with most EU directives, save for a few contentious issues related to the judiciary and internal matters. Clearly Kaczyński’s party is not “Euroskeptical”, but is simply pushing back — by the way, mostly for domestic purposes — against some of the EU policies and projects. Describing his policies otherwise is an obvious act of dishonesty and intentional bias.
On most critical issues, the report's authors write, the position of EU citizens in relation to the EU's actions is critical.
This is supported by the two opinion polls mentioned there.
The first question was whether respondents thought the EU had played a positive or negative role in four major crises.
The proportion of positive to negative responses was as follows:
COVID — 31 to 35 (the rest were “don't know” or “don't have an opinion” responses);
the Ukrainian conflict — 29 to 37;
the EU financial/economic crisis — 20 to 41;
the war in Gaza — 10 to 35.
The second question was: “Do you think the EU has generally done a good job or bad job when it comes to its handling of each of the following issues?”
There were five issues listed, with the following ratio of positive to negative indications:
COVID — 50 to 41;
Russia's invasion of Ukraine — 38 to 49;
climate change — 25 to 61;
global economic issues — 24 to 61;
immigration — 17 to 71.
The answer to the next survey question was particularly interesting. Respondents were given a choice between reducing CO₂ emissions at the expense of higher energy bills or lowering energy bills at the expense of not meeting emission targets.
On average, only 25% of the surveyed countries chose the first option, 18% said “neither,” and up to 41% chose lower bills. Only Sweden (37 to 32%) and Portugal (31 to 26%) responded to reducing CO₂ as a priority, possibly due to their mild climate. Response rates ranged from 20 to 48 percent in Poland, 21 to 50 percent in Germany, and 18 to 49 percent in Greece.
The message is crystal clear: citizens in the vast majority of EU countries are unwilling to pay higher energy prices in order to meet climate targets.
Political dynamics in Poland (and not only) display ECFR’s very poor analysis
Kaczyński's PiS has in the recent past (2015-2023) won a significant democratic mandate, securing victories in two consecutive parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as several other elections over eight years, totaling some nine or ten wins. One might not like PiS’ stance and politics (just as I dislike them very much) but one cannot dismiss the huge impact this political force has on the Polish society and the dominating ideology. Smearing it as “far-right” or simply lying about this party that it’s allegedly “Eurosceptic” is not going to help anybody, least of all the current leadership of the EU which has been hysterically denouncing PiS and Kaczyński for the last decade or so without any rational foundation other than the fact that he didn’t agree to some ideas like migration, as to which many societies across the EU, not only the Polish one, were critical. As I said earlier, the report's conclusions are less about factual analysis and more a reflection of the ECFR analysts' perspectives, which align with the views of the EU's top elite.
The report cautions that opponents of mainstream politics are poised to win the most votes in up to nine countries — Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Poland.
These forces are also expected to secure second or third place in another nine countries, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. Krastev and Leonard argue that it is futile for mainstream forces to focus on defending the EU's “achievements” (sic!) in areas where they are heavily criticized by opponents. These contentious areas include the struggle against climate change, the economic crisis, the war in Ukraine, immigration, and the measures taken during the COVID-19 pandemic.
ECFR instructions for shifts in campaign focus and the reality of unavoidable issues
Is it not somewhat peculiar that the report advises mainstream politicians to distance themselves from real, pressing issues that significantly impact the daily lives of European Union citizens?
Even if certain topics, like the war in Ukraine or the COVID pandemic, don't have an immediate direct impact, they still resonate deeply and stir public opinion across the EU.
These are undeniably critical issues present in the hearts and minds of the public.
So, what is actually going on here? Why would a mainstream think tank, employing intellectuals, analysts, and scholars, openly recommend that mainstream parties ignore the most significant and widely discussed themes? These issues not only matter greatly but also engage and appeal to the public.
The report's authors suggest that the mainstream parties should avoid these topics because, on all these issues, the positions and actions of the EU are viewed very critically by its citizens, as indicated by opinion polls cited in the report. This criticism explains why Krastev and Leonard advise mainstream politicians to shift their focus away from these contentious areas to avoid further alienating voters.
The authors of the report conclude that attempting to defend the EU's supposed achievements in contentious areas will only draw more attention to them, thereby increasing support for “Eurosceptic” or “far-right” factions.
This is particularly critical regarding the war in Ukraine, where public sentiment is notably unfavorable.
Instead, they propose a strategic shift outlined in four points:
Make the EP elections a plebiscite on the EU: Play for maximum polarization by framing the elections as a fundamental choice for or against the European Union.
Mobilize pro-EU voters: Historically, pro-EU voters have been more likely to vote than the opposition. Avoiding contentious topics is intended to demobilize the opposition.
Focus on different issues: Shift attention to topics less controversial and more mobilizing for their base, such as women's issues.
Avoid focusing on Ukraine: Present a new political or geopolitical vision of the EU as a counterbalance to the US, especially under Donald Trump.
Despite these recommendations, the intensity and relevance of issues like the war in Ukraine have been so compelling that European politicians could not entirely avoid them.
The presence and increasing significance of these topics forced them into the discourse, reflecting the challenges mainstream parties face in controlling the narrative during the elections. This political landscape, just weeks before the elections, reveals the complexity of balancing strategic campaign advice with the undeniable realities that dominate public concern.
Wrecking the public debate and politics altogether
This is why we are now witnessing a caricature of public debate, where genuine political discussion has been replaced by a relentless carousel of accusations and smear campaigns against various sides of the political spectrum centered around who is “against” the EU and thus working for Putin.
The gravity of these smears and accusations is often overlooked in the fray.
This phenomenon is particularly evident in Poland, and to some extent in the Czech Republic. The political landscape in the Czech Republic, for instance, has been significantly shaped by the negative stance against Andrej Babiš, with the government of Petr Fiala experiencing dramatically low approval ratings, and Fiala himself polling disastrously low at barely a few percent.
Despite this, his cabinet remains one of the most fanatically pro-Ukrainian in the EU alongside Poland, Romania and the Baltics. President Petr Pavel a former low-ranking NATO bureaucrat, who has been in office for just over a year, is similarly perceived by Czech conservatives and many leftist organizations as a media creation of pro-American circles, lacking an independent program.
This issue is of course not confined to Poland and the Czech Republic. In Bulgaria, for instance, candidates expressing even mild concerns about the EU's direction — whether from the left, like Vanya Grigorova, or the right, like Kostadin Kostadinov — are incessantly smeared, particularly by outlets like Radio Free Europe, which have direct links to the American State Department. The result is a political environment where substantive debate is blocked at every attempt by a barrage of hysterical smears.
The smear campaigns against those who do not fully align with current EU policies are intense, aggressive and pervasive. According to the ‘instructions’ laid out by Krastev and Leonard, these dissenting voices are to be downplayed and criticized as “Eurosceptic” or “anti-EU.” The EU is portrayed as the embodiment of democracy, human rights, and protection against threats like Russia and Donald Trump’s America.
However, this strategy has not been entirely successful. The rapid economic decline and the growing public discontent with the handling of the conflict in Ukraine have made it impossible to avoid addressing these criticisms.
As a result, political discourse has devolved into a chaotic exchange of accusations, reaching caricatured proportions. In Poland, this has been particularly evident, with political debate reduced to a series of vulgar and paranoid accusations of being Russian agents or supporting Russia. This climate of paranoia has permeated the Polish parliament and other key institutions, with politicians from various factions shouting at each other in increasingly unacceptable and vulgar tones.
One particularly striking example is the campaign by Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform, which has produced video clips accusing Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice party (PiS) of being complicit with Russia. Despite PiS being a significant political force in Poland, representing nearly half of the population's political sentiments and views, it is relentlessly attacked and smeared. These attacks even go so far as to suggest that PiS is responsible for historical atrocities committed by the Soviets, such as the mass executions in Katyń.
This toxic atmosphere undermines any chance of rational, cultured discussion, reducing the political landscape to a battleground of baseless accusations and extreme polarization. The inability to engage in substantive debate about real issues facing the EU, such as the economic crisis and the war in Ukraine, further erodes public trust and contributes to the overall degradation of political discourse in Poland, Bulgaria and beyond.
Instead of engaging in discussion with the active minorities of the public in various countries they’ve embarked on deepening polarization and smearing the opponents and the people supporting them. This is clearly a recipe for disaster. And we shall likely see one.